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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission rejecting the 
Referee's proposed findings and holding that the Claimant's industrial injury combined 
with a pre-existing permanent physical impairment to render him totally and permanently 
disabled, thereby subjecting the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) to liability. The 
ISIF agrees that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled after reaching 
maximum medical improvement in August of 201 0, from an industrial accident that 
occurred in January of 2005, and which was aggravated in August of 2008. 
The Claimant's brief on appeal describes the accident succinctly and then 
suggests that this is just a dispute over who should pay the Claimant's total permanent 
disability benefits. From Claimant's perspective that is not an unfair statement since his 
arguments focus not on whether Claimant is so disabled, but on a reimbursement issue 
between Claimant and the Employer/Surety. For the ISIF, it is "why" Claimant is totally 
and permanently disabled that causes this case to present much more than a fight over 
"who pays." 
This case presents the Court with the opportunity to reaffirm for the 
Industrial Commission what is meant by "substantial and competent evidence," as was 
addressed not long ago in Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 302 P.3d 
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718 (20l3). In this case, the only professional medical opinion in the record providing a 
basis or reason for the final restrictions and limitations resulting in Claimant's total and 
permanent disability was given by Dr. David Simon. It is the Industrial Commission's 
second-guessing of his medical testimony and creating its own medical opinion from the 
lack of medical evidence that is the problem in this case. The Commission created its 
own medical facts and opinion, rather than recognizing and applying the competent 
medical evidence before it, as Referee Taylor had done in his proposed decision. 
Additionally, this case presents the opportunity for the Court to reaffirm 
that the "but-for" test set forth in Garcia is still the test to be used by the Industrial 
Commission in determining the "combined with" factor of ISIF liability, and that if 
ignored, the Industrial Commission has committed legal error. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below, Disposition and Judicial Facts 
Claimant filed a Complaint on July 8, 2009, in respect to an injury date of 
January 3,2005. The Employer/Surety filed an Answer to Complaint on July 17,2009, 
admitting there had been an accident on January 3, 2005. Claimant later filed a 
Complaint against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) on January 26, 2011, 
alleging a low back injury as a preexisting physical impairment of consequence. The 
ISIF filed an Answer that denied liability. R., pp. 1-13. 
A hearing was held before Industrial Commission Referee Alan Reed 
6 
Taylor on the following issues: "(1) Whether, and to what extent, Claimant is entitled to 
disability in excess of impairment; (2) Whether apportionment for a pre-existing or 
subsequent condition pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406 is appropriate; (3) Whether 
Claimant is entitled to permanent total disability pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine or 
otherwise; (4) Whether the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund is liable pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-332; (5) Apportionment under the Carey Formula; and (6) Pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-406(2), upon a subsequent injury to the same body part for which income 
benefits were previously paid and now culminating in total permanent disability, is there 
a deduction for the previously paid income benefits received for the previous injury to the 
same body part and, if so, does that deduction inure to the Employer/Surety or to the 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF)?" R., pp. 14-15. The parties agreed that those 
were the issues that needed to be determined. 
After hearing the evidence presented at the hearing and reviewing the post-
hearing briefs and deposition transcripts, Referee Taylor issued his proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation on June 8, 2012, finding no liability on 
the part of ISIF. Referee Taylor noted that the opinions of disability were based on 
restrictions found by the FCE, and that it was Dr. Simon's opinion that the restrictions in 
the FCE were due to the 2005 accident. Referee Alan Taylor's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation (June 8, 2012), p. 13, «)[ 32. Further, Referee 
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Taylor found that "Dr. Simon reaffirmed in his post-hearing deposition that Claimant's 
symptoms and increasing back problems in 2008 were related to his 2005 industrial 
accident. There is no conflicting medical opinion." Id. Referee Taylor concluded that 
"[t]he evidence establishes that Claimant's permanent physical restrictions rendering him 
unemployable all arise from the 2005 accident. Claimant and Employer/Surety have 
failed to establish that Claimant's preexisting impairment combined with his 2005 
industrial injury so as to invoke ISIF liability." Id., pp. 13-14, <J[ 33. 
Id.,p.17. 
Referee Taylor stated his conclusions as follows: 
1. Claimant has proven he suffers permanent disability of 
100%, inclusive of his 15% permanent impairment. He has 
proven he is totally and permanently disabled. 
2. Apportionment pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406( 1) IS 
moot. 
3. ISIF bears no liability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332. 
4. Apportionment under the formula set forth in Carey v. 
Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 
P .2d 54 (1984), is moot. 
5. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406(2), Employer/Surety are 
entitled to a deduction of $27,348.75 for permanent disability 
benefits previously paid for the same body part. 
In contrast, the Industrial Commission filed its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order on July 26, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as the decision 
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and/or order). That Order rejected Referee Taylor's proposed findings, and instead stated 
as follows: 
R., p.41-42. 
1. Claimant has proven that he is totally and permanently 
disabled; 
2. ISIF liability is established; 
3. Claimant has permanent physical impairment totaling 
15%, with 5% referable to the 1994 accident and 10% 
referable to the 2005 accident; 
4. Per Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 
Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984), Employer's liability is 
calculated as follows: 10115 x 85 = 56.7 + 10 = 66.7%, or 
$99,599.78; 
5. ISIF is liable for the payment of statutory benefits 
commencing 333.5 weeks subsequent to Claimant's August 4, 
2010 date of medical stability; 
6. Employer/Surety is not entitled to offset its obligation to 
pay the award by the provisions of Idaho Code 72-406(2). 
7. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and 
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated. 
This appeal was timely filed seeking this Court's review of the errors in the 
Industrial Commission's final action in adopting its own medical opinion and findings, 
outside the evidence. 
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c. Statement of Facts 
The ISIF agrees with the basic facts related in Claimant's brief on appeal 
concerning the Claimant's upbringing, education and work history. Likewise, competent 
medical evidence shows Claimant had a previous injury at the interspace between the L3 
and L4 vertebrae of the lumbar spine which resulted in a 5% permanent impairment. 
On January 3, 2005, Claimant was in the course of his employment 
performing his usual mandatory under-the-hood pre-trip inspection of his delivery semi-
truck which required him to climb about 36" off the ground. When stepping down off the 
truck, his foot slipped on a steel panel under the snow resulting in a very awkward fall 
causing an injury at the L4-5 interspace of his lumbar spine. He received treatment from 
Dr. Clark Allen who eventually performed surgery at the single L4-5 interspace. Ex. D, 
p. 16. In August 2008, Claimant suffered an aggravation of that injury as a result of 
driving a stick-shift pickup truck to Jackson, Wyoming and back to Pocatello in the 
course of his employment. Ex. D, p. 33. In response to a letter from the Surety inquiring 
about the cause for treatment, i.e. whether it was related to his original injury of January 
3,2005, Dr. Allen's partner, Dr. Honeycutt opined that it was related to the 2005 injury 
with no evidence of a new injury, i.e. a progression of the original injury of January 3, 
2005 and a continued decline and failure of his injured disc. Ex. D, p. 43. Dr. Allen 
ultimately performed a lumbar fusion from L2 to L5 to treat the 2005 injury. Ex. D, p. 
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60. Maximum medical improvement was reached on August 4,2010 subsequent to the 
fusion surgery, with a diagnosis of failed back syndrome. 
The deposition testimony of David C. Simon, M. D., was taken December 
7,2011, at Idaho Falls, Idaho. David C. Simon is a physician licensed in the state of 
Idaho specializing in physical medicine and rehabilitation, and board-certified in that 
field. He has practiced in the Idaho Falls area since July 1995. Dr. Simon Depo., p. 5, L. 
2 - p. 6, L. 8. He interviewed the Claimant at the request of the Idaho State Insurance 
Fund and authored reports dated 12110/2008,31112009 and 8/412010. He also had certain 
medical records pertaining to Claimant for review prior to issuing those reports. Dr. 
Simon Depo., p. 6, LL. 9-25. 
The doctor explained his opinion that the appropriate impairment rating 
following the 2005 accident would have been a total of 13% whole person, 5% pre-
existing and 8% new, and after the 2008 aggravation, an additional 2% assigned by Dr. 
Simon himself, or 15% total. Dr. Simon Depo., p. 11, L. 24 - p. 14, L. 11; p. 22, L. 24-
p. 27, L. 10. 
Dr. Simon also stated that Dr. Allen's lumbar decompression and fusion 
surgery on April 6, 2009 was, in his opinion, for treatment of the problems from the 
work-related 2005 injury at the L4-5 level of the lumbar spine, with the fusion spanning 
from L2 to L5. The prior problems in 1994 were at L3-4 and did not require treatment at 
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that point in time. Dr. Simon Depo., p. 14, L. 12 - p. 15, L. 5; p. 27, L. 16 - p. 29, L. 12. 
In Dr. Simon's opinion, Claimant's date of maximum medical 
improvement was August 4,2010, when he examined the Claimant, rather than earlier, 
even though the fusion was fixed and stable earlier. Dr. Simon Depo., p. 31, L. 9 - p. 33, 
L. 21. In the records Dr. Simon had to consider was a Functional Capacity Examination 
report from Corey Rasmussen, PT, DPT from August 2009. Dr. Simon also expressed 
his opinion that the restrictions found in FCE "are permanent and they would be related 
to the industrial injury." Ex. K, p. 14. There is no contradictory or conflicting medical 
opinion in the record. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. The Industrial Commission's finding of combination, subjecting 
ISIF to liability, is not supported by substantial and competent evidence in the 
record. 
B. The Industrial Commission failed to apply the correct legal test 
regarding the potential combined causal effect of the industrial injury of 2005 and 
preexisting permanent physical impairment for purposes of ISIF liability. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 
Factual determinations made by the Industrial Commission will not be 
overturned on appeal if supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Code § 
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72-732; Wernecke v. St. Maries loint School Dist. No. 401,147 Idaho 277, 281, 207 P.3d 
1008, 10 12 (2009). "However, if the findings of the Commission are not supported by 
substantial, competent evidence, they are not binding or conclusive ... [and such] 
findings of fact will be set aside on appeal." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 
Idaho 750,302 P.3d 718,726 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
"Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion." Henry v. Dept. of Correction and State Insurance Fund, 
154 Idaho 143,295 P.3d 528,530 (2013). "Whether the Commission's factual findings 
are supported by substantial and competent evidence is a question of law." Tarbet v. l.R. 
Simplot Company, 151 Idaho 755,758,264 P.3d 394,397 (2011). The Court exercises 
free review over questions of law. Henry v. Dept. of Correction and State Insurance 
Fund, 154 Idaho 143,295 P.3d 528,530 (2013). "Whether the Commission correctly 
applied the law to the facts is an issue of law over which [the Court] exercises free 
review." Id. While Idaho's worker's compensation statutes are construed liberally in 
favor of the worker, "conflicting facts need not be construed liberally in favor of the 
worker." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 302 P.3d 718,723 (2013). 
IV. THE LAW DEFINING THE SCOPE OF ISIF LIABILITY 
The ISIF is often referred to as the Second Injury Fund because of the law 
governing the circumstances under which a claimant is entitled to benefits from the Fund. 
13 
The scope of ISIF liability is governed by Idaho Code § 72-332, which states, in relevant 
part: 
72-332. Payment for second injuries from industrial special 
indemnity account. (1) If an employee who has a permanent 
physical impairment from any cause or origin, incurs a 
subsequent disability by an injury or occupational disease 
arising out of and in the course of his employment, and by 
reason of the combined effects of both the pre-existing 
impairment and the subsequent injury or occupational disease 
or by reason of the aggravation and acceleration of the 
pre-exlstmg impairment suffers total and permanent 
disability, the employer and surety shall be liable for payment 
of compensation benefits only for the disability caused by the 
injury or occupational disease, including scheduled and 
unscheduled permanent disabilities, and the injured employee 
shall be compensated for the remainder of his income benefits 
out of the industrial special indemnity account. ... 
Idaho Code § 72-332. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that under this provision, in 
order for IS IF liability to be established, a claimant must prove four elements of a prima 
facie case, as follows: "(1) that there was a pre-existing impairment; (2) that the 
impairment was manifest; (3) that the impairment was a subjective hindrance; and (4) 
that the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury in some way combine[d] to 
result in total permanent disability." Bybee v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 
129 Idaho 76,80,921 P.2d 1200, 1204 (1996) (citing Dumaw v. 1.L. Norton Logging, 
118 Idaho 150, 155,795 P.2d 312,317 (1990)). 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Industrial Commission's finding of combination, subjecting 
ISIF to liability, is not supported by substantial and competent evidence in the 
record. 
The Industrial Commission's decision to impose liability on ISIF must be 
supported by substantial and competent evidence as to all elements of the prima facie 
case. Idaho Code § 72-732; see also Dumaw v. J.L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150,795 
P.2d 312 (1990). The burden is on the party seeking to impose liability on ISIF to prove 
all elements of the prima facie case. Garcia v. J.R. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 970, 772 
P.2d 173, 177 (1989). Substantial and competent evidence is "more than a scintilla of 
proof, but less than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion." Funes v. Aardema Dairy, 150 Idaho 7,10-11,244 P.3d 
151,154-55 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Though the 
Commission is the final arbiter of the evidence, it cannot arbitrarily create medical 
evidence nor weigh medical evidence that is not part of the evidentiary the record. 
Finally, a finding that a particular fact cannot be found to the requisite certainty is the 
equivalent of a holding that the burden of proof has not been met. Manning v. Potlatch 
Forests, Inc., 93 Idaho 856, 857, fn. 2,477 P.2d 97,98 (1970). 
A recent Idaho Supreme Court case, Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 
15 
154 Idaho 750, 302 P.3d 718 (2013), is highly instructive with respect to what will be 
considered substantial and competent medical evidence in a worker's compensation case. 
In that case, the Court found that the Commission's referee had disregarded qualified 
medical opinions and had substituted her own medical opinion. Mazzone, 302 P.3d at 
727. In so holding, the Court stated that the referee and Commission "must accept as true 
the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless the testimony is 
inherently improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing 
or trial." Mazzone, 302 P.3d at 726, quoting Pierstorffv. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 
438,447,72 P.2d 171 (1937). The Commission's role "is that of a finder of fact and not 
a medical expert," and the Commission may not exceed that role and "engage[] in 
medical diagnosis." Mazzone, 302 P.3d at 728. 
Further, the Court stated that although members of an administrative board 
or agency may have acquired some expertise in a particular area of administrative law, 
"[t]here is ... a line between use of that expertise and the adjudicative function of 
resolving factual disputes in administrative proceedings." [d. The Court noted that the 
United States Supreme Court has held that administrative officers may not act on their 
own information, and "that an agency that uses its specialized knowledge as a substitute 
for evidence will not have its order sustained." Mazzone, 302 P.3d at 728-29, quoting 
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258, 263 (1924). The Court 
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concluded that "an agency may not use its specialized knowledge as a substitute for 
evidence presented at a hearing. An agency may, however, utilize its expertise in 
drawing inferences from the facts or record or to resolve conflicts in the evidence." 
Mazzone, 302 P.3d at 729 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
The legal error in the Commission's fact-finding methodology is evident 
when paragraphs 19-22,26,27,36, and 4S-47 are considered under the legal criteria set 
forth in Mazzone. 
In paragraph 19, the Commission found that "[t]he record does not reflect 
that Dr. Huneycutt took any history from Claimant concerning the low back difficulties 
from which he had suffered prior to the date of the January 3, 200S accident ... 
Therefore, in the absence of a history of an intervening event, Dr. Huneycutt was of the 
view that Claimant's continuing problems at L4-S represented a natural progression from 
the original injury. Notably, Dr. Huneycutt did not comment on the genesis or cause of 
Claimant's degenerative disc disease at levels other than L4-S." R., p. 26-27, q[ 19. 
Similarly, in paragraph 21, the Commission stated: "As did Huneycutt, Dr. Simon 
concluded that in the absence of a history of intervening injury or MRI changes 
consistent with an acute disc herniation, Claimant's L4-S problems were likely a 
progression of the problems first noted following the 200S work injury." R., p. 28, q[ 21. 
The Commission takes Dr. Huneycutt's and Dr. Simon's failure to mention 
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the prior low back injuries as a failure to consider those injuries. The Commission takes 
the absence of a fact in the record or notes by Dr. Huneycutt or Dr. Simon reflecting a 
review of the prior low back problems and turns it into a positive fact that the doctors did 
not know about or consider the prior low back injuries. The absence of notes or 
testimony could just as easily mean that the doctors did not think they were important and 
did not contribute to the Claimant's current problems. There is no substantial and 
competent evidence in the record as to why the doctors did not mention the prior low 
back problems, and the Commission cannot create this as evidence in the record and rely 
upon it to make its own findings. Even if it is true that the doctors did not review the 
prior low back problems, it does not follow that a review of those problems would have 
changed their opinions. In Mazzone, the referee excluded a certain doctor's opinion 
because she believed that the doctor's "opinions would change if she had considered 
additional evidence." Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho 750, 302 P.3d 718, 
727 (2013). The Court stated: "A referee may not undiagnose a claimant before the 
Commission based on the referee's own lay understanding of what the referee believes 
would change a qualified medical professional's diagnosis and professional opinion." Id. 
Next, the Commission concluded, in paragraph 45, that "[i]t is equally clear 
that Claimant's L2-5 fusion was undertaken because of the L4-5 lesion thought to be 
related to the January 3, 2005 accident and the multilevel degenerative changes in 
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Claimant's lumbar spine first noted in 1994, and progressing thereafter." R., p. 20, <J[ 45. 
There is no competent medical evidence in the record establishing that surgery was 
necessitated by the 2005 accident and the prior low back problems. The Commission 
appears to have concluded that because the surgery covered both the L4-5 problem and 
the higher levels, the surgery was, at least in part, necessitated by the prior problems. 
Going even further, the Commission appears to conclude, in the absence of any 
competent medical evidence, that the surgery would not have been necessary due to the 
2005 accident alone. These possible steps of logic cannot substitute for medical opinion 
on these issues. 
Similarly, the Commission found that "it is notable that the only injury 
identified with the January 3, 2005 accident is the L4-5 disc herniation. However, the 
February 15, 2005 MRI demonstrates severe degenerative changes at levels above and 
below the L4-5 level. The findings at these levels demonstrate significant progression of 
the degenerative process in the years since the prior 1994 study, a progression that has 
not been related by any medical expert to the January 3, 2005 accident." R., pp. 36-37, <J[ 
45. No one is denying that Claimant had pre-existing problems at other levels of the 
spine that were not related to the 2005 accident. According to the Commission's 
analysis, the fact that those problems existed, and no doctor says they are related to the 
2005 accident, means the inquiry is over. 
19 
In paragraph 46 of its decision, the Industrial Commission further 
substituted its own experience for medical opinion in the record when it stated "[I]n the 
absence of multilevel problems, surgeons typically prefer to limit fusion procedures to 
levels where it is absolutely necessary in order to preserve lumbar spine motion." R., p. 
37, <j[ 46. 
Finally, and most importantly, the Commission completely disregarded the 
only competent medical opinion in the record as to the cause of Claimant's current 
restrictions and thus his total and permanent disability. In paragraph 26, the Commission 
stated: "Although Dr. Simon stated that a causal relationship existed between Claimant's 
complaints and the 2005 work injury, he did not state that the 2005 work injury was the 
exclusive cause of Claimant's failed back syndrome. Indeed, in his subsequent 
deposition, Dr. Simon proposed that the need for the L2-5 fusion surgery was, in part, 
causally related to Claimant's multilevel degenerative disc disease." R., p. 29, <j[ 26. 
Although Dr. Simon did not use the word "exclusive," it does not mean the Commission 
can substitute its own medical opinion based on the doctor's clear speculation that the 
need for the surgery may have been related to the degenerative disc disease. Far from 
"proposing" that the need for surgery was related to the prior back problems, what Dr. 
Simon actually said was: "I'm not a surgeon. I'm not sure why he went up to the L2, but 
that being closer to the L3-4 level. I mean, that level would also be - you know, that 
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would more likely be related to the pre-existing problems and the problems at the L3-4 
level than the work-related L4-5 level." Dr. Simon Depo., p. 14, L. 25 - p. 15, L. 5. 
Further, the Commission found: 
We recognize that Dr. Simon has stated that the 
limitations/restrictions defined in the FCE are related to the 
January 3, 2005 accident. At first blush, this appears to 
support a conclusion that it is the 2005 accident, standing 
alone, and without contribution from the preexisting 
impairment, that renders Claimant totally and permanently 
disabled. If true, then there can be no 'combining with' and 
the claim against the ISIF would fail on this element of the 
prima facie case. However, Dr. Simon was not examined 
about this statement at the time of his deposition, and it is not 
entirely clear that his intentions in making this statement are 
as described by the ISIF. 
R., p. 36, I}[ 44 (emphasis added). Dr. Simon stated a clear medical opinion regarding the 
cause of the restrictions resulting in Claimant's total permanent disability. The Industrial 
Commission disregarded that clear opinion because the doctor was not asked about it at 
his deposition, and they do not know what his "intentions" were. This is the creation of 
evidence from the lack of evidence discussed in Mazzone as a denial of due process. The 
Commission shifted the burden to IS IF to prove the case against itself where the evidence 
was not in the record. 
There was one competent medical opinion that Claimant's total and 
permanent disability was the result of the 2005 industrial accident. There is absolutely no 
contradicting medical opinion. In the absence of a contradicting opinion, the 
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Commission disregarded the one qualified medical opinion and substituted its own 
unqualified, and wholly unsupported, opinion. 
The Referee's proposed findings and conclusions followed the law and the 
proper legal analysis of the evidence of record. As noted previously, that proposed 
decision noted the Claimant's total permanent disability in the opinions of both 
vocational experts, received into evidence, but each of which relied on the restrictions 
contained in the Functional Capacity Examination of August 2009, which according to 
the only medical opinion in the evidence, were causally related to the injury of January 
2005. As was noted in that recommended decision, "[tJhere is no conflicting medical 
opinion." Referee Alan Taylor's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation (June 8, 2012), p. 13, ~132 (emphasis added). 
The Commission, on the other hand, came up with an analysis based on the 
lack of evidence of information considered by various physicians to create positive 
evidence, and on its own experience of why surgeons fuse more than one level of a spine, 
to decide that there was a conflict in the medical evidence justifying their rejection of Dr. 
Simon's clearly stated opinion. Such is reversible error, not harmless error as it was 
deemed in Mazzone, as this action of the Commission hits right to the heart of the issue of 
ISIF liability. The Court should not condone such legal error. 
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B. The Industrial Commission failed to apply the correct legal test 
regarding combination for purposes of ISIF liability. 
The fourth element in a prima facie case to establish ISIF liability is 
combination - the preexisting physical impairment and the industrial injury must 
combine in some way to cause the claimant's total and permanent disability. In Garcia v. 
l.R. Simplot Co., the Court set forth the test that is to be utilized by the Industrial 
Commission in determining whether the combination element of a prima facie case 
against IS IF has been met. 115 Idaho 966, 772 P.2d 173 (1989). In that case, ISIF 
argued, and the Idaho Supreme Court agreed, "that is it not sufficient under I.e. § 72-
332(1) to show simply that a claimant is totally and permanently disabled and suffered 
from some pre-existing condition that can be defined as a permanent physical 
impairment." Garcia, 115 Idaho at 970, 772 P.2d at 177. Instead, the Court held "that 
the burden of proof is on the party seeking to invoke the liability of ISIF under the statute 
to show that the disability would not have been total 'but for' the pre-existing condition." 
Id. The Commission cannot arbitrarily shift the legal burden of proof to the party 
defending the claim. 
Burden of proof means both the "duty of establishing the truth of a given 
proposition or issue by such quantum of evidence as the law demands and an "obligation 
resting upon a party to meet with evidence of a prima facie case." Hannan v. 
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Northwestern Mutual L~fe Insurance Co., 91 Idaho 719,721,429 P.2d 849,851 (1967), 
citing 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence, Sec. 123, p. 154. In Worker's Compensation cases, the 
Claimant must show a "claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability." Cole v. Stokely Van Camp, 118 Idaho 173, 175, 795 P.2d 872,874 (1990). 
The "but for" test set forth in Garcia has been consistently reiterated and 
applied by the Court since that time. See, e.g., Selzler v. State of Idaho, Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund, 124 Idaho 144, 146, 857 P.2d 623,626 (1993) ("ISIF is not 
liable unless the disability would not have been total but for a preexisting condition."); 
Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho 186, 192,207 P.3d 162, 168 (2009) (Industrial 
Commission used correct standard when it "looked at 'whether [claimant's] pre-existing 
physical impairments combined with the last accident to render him totally and 
permanently disabled, or stated another way, whether [claimant] would have been totally 
and permanently disabled but for his last accident."'); Wernecke v. St. Maries loint 
School Dist. No. 401,147 Idaho 277, 284, 207 P.3d 1008,1015 (2009) ("ISIF is liable to 
provide compensation to a worker only when the claimant shows that he or she is totally 
and permanently disabled because of the combination of a permanent pre-existing 
physical impairment and a new industrial injury.") (emphasis in original). 
In the instant case, the Commission failed to apply the but-for test set forth 
in Garcia in its analysis of the combination factor of ISIF liability. The Commission 
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concluded that because Claimant was rendered totally and permanently disabled after his 
back surgery, and because the Commission decided that the back surgery addressed both 
new and old physical problems, ISIF liability was established. That analysis and 
conclusion utterly fails to apply the but-for test. The inquiry the Commission should 
have made is: Would Claimant have been totally and permanently disabled but for the 
preexisting impairment; and, would he have been totally and permanently disabled but 
for the last accident, or in other words, would the restrictions from the 2005 accident 
have rendered the Claimant totally and permanently disabled without regard to the prior 
physical impairment? The Commission must find from the evidence, not its own medical 
opinion, that but for the pre-existing impairments, Claimant would not have been totally 
and permanently disabled. That analysis cannot be satisfied merely by finding that 
Claimant had pre-existing permanent physical impairments. 
By its analysis, the Industrial Commission impermissibly shifted the burden 
to the ISIF to produce evidence that it is not liable, rather than examining the record to 
see whether there is a prima facie case against it. By taking medical opinion, for which 
there was no conflicting medical opinion, and creating a conflict, not from evidence but 
from its medical analysis, the Commission impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to 
the ISIF, a legal error. 
The case of Tarbet v. l.R. Simplot Co. is instructive here. 151 Idaho 755, 
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264 P.3d 396 (2011). In that case, the Industrial Commission held "that the employee's 
final injury caused him to be permanently and totally disabled, without considering his 
prior injuries, so that the employer, rather than the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 
[was] liable for the employee's total disability payments." Tarbet, 151 Idaho at 757,264 
P.3d at 396. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the employer argued that "the 
uncontested evidence showed 'that [employee] had significant problems with his hearing 
loss and low back injury and these impairments impacted [employee's] ability to perform 
his job.'" Tarbet, 151 Idaho at 759,264 P.3d at 398. The employer "then recount[ed] 
testimony showing the impact of these impairments upon how [employee] performed his 
job, the actions he took such as changing how he performed certain work and requesting 
assistance from others, and the accommodations made by Employer." Id. As to that 
argument, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: "Employer's argument in this regard misses 
the point. Employer cannot sustain its burden of proof merely by showing that Claimant 
had pre-existing impairments. Employer has not contended that Claimant was totally 
disabled prior to his last industrial accident. It must show that but for the pre-existing 
impairments, Claimant would not have been totally and permanently disabled. Employer 
cannot sustain that burden merely by showing that Claimant had pre-existing permanent 
impairments." Id. 
Like the employer's argument in Tarbet, the Industrial Commission's 
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analysis in this case "misses the point." The Commission rests its finding of ISIF liability 
solely on the fact that when doing surgery to address the problems at the L4-5 level of 
Claimant's lumbar spine, Dr. Allen also extended the fusion to the L2-3 and L3-4levels. 
The problems at the L4-5 level were due to the 2005 industrial accident, while the 
problems at L2-3 and L3-4 were due to pre-existing degenerative disc disease. 
Therefore, the Industrial Commission concludes without medical opinion that Claimant's 
surgery, and the extent of it, was necessitated by both the subject accident and Claimant's 
preexisting condition. This is the equivalent of the employer's argument in Tarbet, and 
completely disregards the requirement of combination. 
No one is disputing that Claimant had pre-existing degenerative disc 
disease at those levels of his lumbar spine. However, the mere fact that he had such a 
pre-existing condition, or even that the surgeon spanned those levels while trying to 
stabilize the L4-5 disc space, does not mean that the pre-existing condition "combined 
with" the new injury to render Claimant totally and permanently disabled. The medical 
evidence in the record is to the effect that the 2005 injury, as aggravated in 2008, was the 
reason surgery was performed. There is no competent medical opinion in the record 
indicating anything otherwise. There is likewise no conflicting medical opinion that the 
restrictions following surgery were causally related to the 2005 injury, with no opinion 
attributing them to preexisting physical impairment. 
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In other words, there is no competent medical evidence in the record that 
"but for" the pre-existing impairment, the 2009 surgery, as performed, would not have 
been necessary. However, the Industrial Commission did not even mention or attempt to 
apply the "but for" test necessary for finding ISIF liability. Instead, the Commission 
simply determined that since there was a pre-existing impairment, and since the surgeon 
spanned higher levels of the spine in attempting to fix the 200512008 L4-5 injury from 
the industrial accident, "it is clear that the combining with element of the prima facie case 
has been met." R., p. 37, I}[ 47. 
VI. RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S APPEAL 
It is evident, but nevertheless should be expressed, that the IS IF has no 
interest in the issue raised by the Claimant! Appellant. Therefore, the ISIF will not 
present written or oral argument on that issue. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission both created its own medical opinion to serve 
the decision it wished to issue imposing liability on the ISIF, rather than relying on the 
evidence of record, and also ignored the "but for" test on whether the last industrial injury 
combined with any preexisting permanent physical impairment in causing the Claimant's 
total and permanent disability. This case is not one where the Industrial Commission 
issued an opinion requesting more evidence to clarify issues it felt were not resolved by 
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the evidence of record. Rather, the Commission acted upon the of rp."nrri 
improperly to reach a result and ordered that the decision was final and conclusive as to 
all matters adjudicated pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-718. The Commission's 
decision acknowledges that the ISIF would not be liable absent ignoring Dr. Simon's 
clear medical opinion that the 2005 injury was the cause of the restrictions resulting 
Claimant's total permanent disability. Accordingly, the Court should reverse 
Industrial Commission's decision and order the case against the upon 
evidence in the record. 
this __ October, 2013. 
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